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Executive Summary
Through the use of intermediaries such as elected officials and hired advocates,
people choose the level of resources that will be used for public goods and services, as
well as the manner in which those resources will be used. They also decide how these
goods and services will be financed. The extent to which governments utilize taxes on
income, wealth, and consumption is guided by considerations of political factors, equity,
administrative costs, revenue adequacy, and the effects of the tax system on allocative
efficiency. Incentives that are embedded in the federal tax system may also influence
state and local tax structures.
Taxpayers who itemize can deduct state and local income and property taxes from
income that is subject to the federal income tax. General sales taxes can be deducted in
place of income taxes. In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
recommended the elimination of the federal tax deductibility of all state and local taxes.
If state and local tax structures are responsive to federal tax deductibility, then this policy
change could affect the extent to which governments rely on the three major personal
taxes: income, property, and sales. I attempted to estimate the nature of the effect by
conducting a multivariate regression analysis on the cross-section of the fifty states. The
results suggest that the elimination of federal tax deductibility would induce a shift in
state and local tax structures from income to consumption taxation. Since it is possible
that consumption taxation distorts economic behavior to a lesser degree than income
taxation, this policy change may increase the efficiency of state and local tax systems.
However, consumption taxation tends to place heavier tax burdens on low-income
households while income taxation tends to place heavier tax burdens on wealthy
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households. This means that the elimination of federal tax deductibility may reduce the
vertical equity of state and local tax systems. However, the federal income tax may
become more progressive, since the wealthy derive the greatest benefit from the federal
tax deductibility of state and local taxes.
Introduction
State and local taxes have been deductible from the federal income tax to some
degree since 1913, when the federal income tax was created. All taxes, including federal,
state, and local taxes not directly tied to a benefit, were originally deductible. The nature
of the deduction has changed over the years. Legislation enacted in 1964 limited
deductibility to a list of explicitly deductible state and local taxes. These were taxes on
real and personal property, income, general sales, “and the sale of gasoline, diesel fuel,
and other motor fuels” (Maguire 1). In the mid-1980s, the U.S. Treasury Department
called for the elimination of the deduction. The resulting legislation contained in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 only eliminated the deductibility of state and local sales taxes
(Reuben 498). After 1986, only property and income taxes were deductible. This
changed in 2004 with the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act, which reinstated
the general sales tax deduction in lieu of income taxes (Reuben 498). Itemizers can
choose to deduct general sales taxes instead of income taxes. But itemizers in states with
income taxes probably pay more income tax than sales tax. Thus, the sales tax deduction
will probably be utilized most heavily in states without broad-based personal income
taxes. The deduction was set to expire at the end of FY 2005. However, the Tax Relief
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Extension Reconciliation Act of 2005, which has been passed by both houses of
Congress, extends the deduction through 2008 (United States. Library of Congress).1
In 2005, President Bush commissioned the Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform. The panel sought to simplify the federal income tax code and reduce its
inefficient qualities. Its recommendations included limiting the deductibility of owneroccupied housing, reducing income tax rates, and eliminating the deductibility of state
and local taxes. The deductibility of state and local taxes should be eliminated, the panel
argued, because it induces higher demand for state and local government services and is
thus inefficient. It also involves a transfer of income from jurisdictions that have
relatively low demand for state and local services to those that have a relatively high
demand. The panel concluded that state and local government services should be treated
like any nondeductible personal expense, such as food and clothing and that the costs of
those services should not be borne by every taxpayer in the country (President’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform 83).
How would the elimination of federal tax deductibility affect the extent to which
state and local governments rely on personal income, sales, and property taxes? In order
to answer that question, one must estimate the influence that federal tax deductibility has
had on the finance decisions of state and local governments. Federal tax deductibility
lowers the cost, or price, of state and local government spending that is financed from
deductible taxes. If an individual is an itemizer, an additional dollar of state and local tax
payment from a deductible revenue source reduces his or her federal income tax liability.
Therefore, the net-of-federal tax price of deductible tax revenue that an itemizer faces is
$1 minus his or her marginal federal tax rate. A lower tax price increases the itemizer’s
1

As of April 6, 2006, the bill was in conference committee.
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preference for deductible revenue sources, holding all other factors constant. The price
of a dollar of spending from a nondeductible revenue source is $1. For a non-itemizer, an
additional dollar of state and local spending from any revenue source is $1. The
elimination of the federal tax deductibility of state and local taxes would raise the net-offederal tax price of deductible revenues to $1. If state and local tax structures are
responsive to tax price, then this policy change could affect state and local tax structures.
However, it is also possible that considerations of equity, efficiency, administrative ease,
and political feasibility outweigh the influence of tax price. If that is the case, then the
elimination of federal tax deductibility would not have a substantial effect on state and
local tax structures. The most recent study on the effect of federal tax deductibility on
the use of different personal taxes is a 1987 study by Lawrence Lindsey. The author used
revenue and taxpayer data from 1983. This research may be outdated. Uncertainty about
the impact of the proposed elimination of the federal deductibility of state and local taxes
is the policy problem that motivated the present study. The following section describes
previous studies on the effect that the elimination of federal tax deductibility may have on
state and local tax structures.
Previous Research
I am aware of four studies that examine the effect of federal tax deductibility on
the mix of state and local tax revenues. Two of those studies, Inman (1985) and Hettich
and Winer (1984) are highly problematic. Inman studies the influence of federal
deductibility on the use of income, sales, and property taxes, as well as fees, in 41 large
cities from 1960 to 1980. Hettich and Winer examine the relationship between federal
tax deductibility and the extent to which state governments rely on personal income
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taxes. While Inman looks only at local government revenues, Hettich and Winer analyze
only state government revenues. These approaches ignore the variety in the division of
taxing and spending responsibilities between state and local governments among the
states (Feldstein and Metcalf 715-716). It is not surprising that these studies report
puzzling results. Inman finds that a higher net-of-federal tax price for property tax
revenue coincides with a reduced use of income and sales taxes and vice versa (Inman
13-14). Hettich and Winer find that the effect of federal tax deductibility on income tax
revenue is insignificant (67).
Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and Lindsey (1987) estimate the impact that the
elimination of federal tax deductibility would have on the mix of combined state and
local revenues, along with the impact on state and local government spending. Feldstein
and Metcalf conduct a multivariate regression analysis on the cross section of the fifty
states to measure the influence of average net-of-federal tax price, along with other
factors, on two dependent variables: per capita deductible tax revenue as a percentage of
per capita income and per capita nondeductible tax revenue as a percentage of per capita
income. The authors find that tax price correlates negatively and significantly with
revenue from deductible taxes but insignificantly with nondeductible tax revenue.
Lindsey examines the effect that the elimination of federal tax deductibility would have
on per capita income, sales, and property tax revenue. He uses various measures of tax
price, including Feldstein’s and Metcalf’s measure of average net-of-federal tax price.
He finds that neither property nor sales tax revenues are responsive to tax price. The
correlation between tax price and income tax revenue is highly significant and negative.
In both studies, the authors utilized taxpayer and revenue data that pre-dated the
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elimination of sales tax deductibility in 1986. For that reason, I conducted a statistical
analysis on the subject using more recent data.
Methodology
The impact of the elimination of deductibility is likely to depend on the influence
that it has already had on state and local tax structures. With that in mind, I use a
multivariate regression model on the cross-section of the fifty states. I quantify the
manner in which federal tax deductibility lowers the cost of spending from deductible
revenues by following the procedure that Feldstein and Metcalf use in their 1987 study.
By multiplying the average marginal federal income tax rate for itemizers in a state by
the proportion of itemizers in the state’s population,2 and then subtracting the product
from 1, I arrive at the average net-of-federal tax price. The regression model includes the
average net-of-federal tax prices for all fifty states, along with other variables, which
were used in previous studies, which may influence the amounts of revenue derived from
the three personal taxes. Among the control variables are per-capita income and the
homeownership rate (see Appendix 2 for a detailed explanation of the regression model).
The model is intended to convey the relationship between tax price and revenues from
personal income, sales, and property taxes. I express the dependent variables as per capita
revenue as a percentage of per capita income. The state and local revenue data is from
the 2002 Census of Governments. I used data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
“Individual Tax Statistics—State Income for 2000 and 2001” to calculate the tax price
variable. I used data from the 2001 tax year since it corresponds to the revenue data from

2

See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of the procedure used to calculate average marginal tax rates.
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the 2002 census. In 2001, only state and local income and property taxes were deductible
from the federal income tax. Sales taxes were not deductible at that time.
Results
The results of the estimation of the regression equations indicate that federal tax
deductibility of state and local taxes significantly affects state and local tax structures.
The specific findings of the analysis are: (1) There is a negative relationship between tax
price and income tax revenue as a proportion of personal income that is highly
significant. (2) There is a positive relationship between tax price and sales tax revenue as
a proportion of income that is also highly significant. (3) The use of property tax revenue
does not appear to be sensitive to tax price. It is important to note that the property tax is
the primary revenue source for local governments. The lack of a significant relationship
may be attributable to the fact that local governments in different states rely on state
transfers to different degrees. This variation could mask the influence of tax price. As
mentioned in the section on previous research, Inman (1985) isolates local governments
in his analysis of the influence of federal tax deductibility on local tax structures and
obtains unusual results.
Tables 1 through 3 contain the regression outputs. For the regression on income
tax revenue, the tax price coefficient is -0.914. In 2001, the average net-of-federal tax
price was $0.91. The elimination of federal tax deductibility would raise the effective
price of one dollar’s worth of state and local revenue from formerly deductible sources to
$1 in every state. This means that the policy change may reduce the ratio of income tax
revenue to personal income by 8 percentage points on average.3 The tax price coefficient

3

The relationship is negative and significant with the 9 states without broad-based income taxes removed
from the analysis. However, the coefficient for tax price is smaller at -0.3.
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for sales tax revenue is 0.52. Thus, the elimination of federal deductibility may reduce
the ratio of sales tax revenue to personal income by 4.6 percentage points.4
Table 1: Income Tax Revenue Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Per capita state and local income
tax revenue as a proportion of per capita income.
Intercept
Per Capita Income
Per Cap Federal Transfers as % of Per Cap Income
Price*
Pupils Per Capita
Road Mileage Per Capita
% Nonwhite
% Poverty
% Over Age 65
Homeownership Rate
% Urban
Married
Gini Ratio
Dividend and Interest Income Per $ of AGI
Capital Gains Income Per $ of AGI
Government Ideology
Citizen Ideology
R-Square
Adjusted R-Square
F Statistic
Significance of F
* Significant at 1 % Confidence Level

4

Coefficients
0.9
-0.000000625
0.174
-0.914
0.069
0.036
0.011
0.095
0.397
-0.131
-0.042
0.003
0.082
-0.562
-0.0427
-0.00009
0.0001
0.67
0.511
4.201
0.0002

Standard
Error
0.189
0.000000458
0.13
0.146
0.19
0.113
0.022
0.118
0.195
0.0654
0.026
0.145
0.155
0.345
0.191
0.0001
0.0002

t Stat
4.742
-1.363
1.336
-6.231
0.366
0.317
0.529
0.803
2.033
-2.015
-1.605
0.0235
0.529
-1.627
-0.223
-0.922
0.493

P-value
0.0000393
0.181
0.19
0.000000489
0.716
0.753
0.599
0.427
0.05
0.052
0.118
0.981
0.6
0.113
0.824
0.362
0.625

The relationship is insignificant when the 9 states without broad-based income taxes are removed from
the analysis.
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Table 2: Sales Tax Revenue Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Per capita state and local general
and selective sales tax revenue as a percentage of per
capita income.
Intercept
Per Capita Income*
Per Cap Federal Transfers as % of Per Cap Income**
Price*
Pupils Per Capita
Road Mileage Per Capita
% Nonwhite
% Poverty
% Over Age 65
Homeownership Rate
% Urban
Married
Gini Ratio
Dividend and Interest Income Per $ of AGI
Capital Gains Income Per $ of AGI
Government Ideology
Citizen Ideology
R-Square
Adjusted R-Square
F Statistic
Significance of F
*Significant at the 1 % Confidence Level
**Significant at the 5 % Confidence Level

Coefficients
-0.439
-0.00000221
-0.358
0.52
0.17
-0.007
0.0343
0.12
-0.021
0.041
0.023
-0.037
-0.03
0.04
0.263
0.00003
0.00009
0.591
0.393
2.984
0.003

Standard
Error
0.228
0.000000551
0.157
0.176
0.229
0.136
0.026
0.143
0.235
0.078
0.031
0.175
0.186
0.415
0.229
0.0001
0.0002

t Stat
-1.923
-4.002
-2.282
2.945
0.741
-0.055
1.293
0.84
-0.093
0.522
0.749
-0.216
-0.161
0.096
1.145
0.249
0.348

Pvalue
0.063
0.0003
0.029
0.005
0.463
0.955
0.204
0.406
0.926
0.604
0.459
0.83
0.872
0.923
0.26
0.804
0.729
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Table 3: Property Tax Revenue Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Per capita state and local property
tax revenue as a percentage of per capita income.
Intercept
Per Capita Income
Per Cap Federal Transfers as % of Per Cap Income
Price
Pupils Per Capita
Road Mileage Per Capita
% Nonwhite
% Poverty*
% Over Age 65
Homeownership Rate
% Urban
Married
Gini Ratio
Dividend and Interest Income Per $ of AGI
Capital Gains Income Per $ of AGI
Government Ideology
Citizen Ideology
R-Square
Adjusted R-Square
F Statistic
Significance of F
*Significant at the 1 % Confidence Level

Coefficients
0.0009
-0.000000558
0.126
0.11
0.169
-0.128
-0.037
-0.355
-0.007
-0.055
-0.033
-0.105
0.132
0.158
0.215
-0.00003
0.0001
0.649
0.479
3.824
0.000547929

Standard
Error
0.177
0.000000428
0.122
0.137
0.178
0.106
0.02
0.111
0.182
0.061
0.024

t Stat
0.005
-1.303
1.034
0.809
0.95
-1.208
-1.836
-3.199
-0.041
-0.911
-1.358

Pvalue
0.995
0.201
0.308
0.424
0.348
0.235
0.075
0.003
0.967
0.368
0.183

0.136
0.144
0.322
0.178
0.00009
0.0002

-0.778
0.917
0.49
1.21
-0.361
0.506

0.442
0.365
0.626
0.234
0.719
0.616
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Since tax price varies among states, the impact of the policy change is likely to
vary as well. Table 4 shows the possible effects of the elimination of federal tax
deductibility in three states: West Virginia, which had the highest average net-of-federal
tax price among states that tax income in 2001; Alabama, which faced an average tax
price close to the national median; and Maryland, which faced the lowest average tax
price. Since Maryland has the lowest tax price, it is likely to experience the greatest
changes in income and sales tax revenues. Income tax revenue as a proportion of
personal income may decline by 12.8 percentage points while sales tax revenue as a
proportion of personal income may increase by 7.3 percentage points. The impact
experienced by West Virginia is likely to be smaller, since it currently faces a higher tax
price. In that state, income tax revenue as a proportion of personal income may decrease
by 4.7 percentage points while sales tax revenue as a proportion of personal income may
increase by 2.6 percentage points. It is hard to guess how the policy change would affect
the nine states without broad-based personal income taxes.5 In 2001, the only revenue
type that was deductible in those states was the property tax. Property tax revenue is not
responsive to tax price. It is doubtful that the elimination of federal tax deductibility
would lead to increased use of sales taxes in states that already rely heavily on sales
taxes. The matter is further complicated by the recently enacted deductibility of general
sales taxes in lieu of income taxes. It is too soon to test the effect of that policy change.
However, if sales tax revenue is a substitute for income tax revenue, the sales tax
deduction should not alter that relationship.

5

Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do not have state or local
personal income taxes. In New Hampshire and Tennessee, dividend and interest income is taxed.
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Table 4: Estimated Effects of the Elimination of Deductibility in 3 States
% Itemizers
Avg Marg Rate for Itemizers
Price
Income Tax Revenue6
Sales Tax Revenue
Estimated Change in Inc Rev
Estimated Change in Sales T Rev

West Virginia
18.5
27.5
0.949
3.5
4.9
-4.7
+2.6

Alabama
32.7
26.5
0.91
2.6
5.9
-8.2
+4.7

Maryland
47.8
27.6
0.86
5.6
3.7
-12.8
+7.3

Limitations of the Analysis
There are characteristics of the data that limit the reliability of the analysis. First,
I estimate the average marginal tax rates faced by itemizers in each state by calculating a
weighted average statutory rate. This approach does not account for individual
circumstances that may cause an itemizer’s marginal tax rate to differ from the statutory
rate. 7 For example, an itemizer who is in the phaseout range of a tax credit would face a
marginal rate that is higher than the statutory rate since his or her taxable income would
increase. This problem reduces the precision of the tax price variable. Another problem
is the fact that the data set consists of only fifty observations. The regression models do
not explain around 40 percent of the variation in revenues. The analysis would have been
strengthened by the use of panel data, but collecting the necessary data would have been
cost-prohibitive in terms of time. The following section is a discussion of the policy
implications of the results of the analysis.
Policy Implications
The results of the analysis discussed in the previous section suggest that the
elimination of federal tax deductibility would induce a shift in state and local taxation

6
7

All revenue figures are expressed as per capita revenue as a percentage of per capita income.
Appendix 1 describes the method that I used to approximate average marginal tax rates for itemizers.
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from income to consumption. This change may alter the efficiency and equity of state
and local tax structures.
The efficiency of a tax depends on the extent to which it alters economic behavior
and the resulting allocation of resources. When a tax alters economic decisions, potential
gains from trade are lost. Thus, the tax imposes an excess burden in addition to the
income that is taxed away. Income taxation reduces the benefit of earning income
relative to leisure. Consequently, the imposition of an income tax may encourage people
to spend more time on leisure. This is the substitution effect of the income tax. The
gains from trade that people could have reaped from the exchange of labor are lost.
However, people may work more to recover income that has been taxed away. This
income effect may offset the substitution effect (Holcombe 235). Income taxation also
reduces the marginal benefit of future consumption relative to present consumption.
Thus, it may discourage saving. But there may also be an income effect as people save
more for particular purposes, such as a down payment on a car (Holcombe 261).
Consumption taxation, like income taxation, lowers the marginal benefit of labor
relative to leisure. However, it does not alter the marginal benefit of future consumption
relative to present consumption. Therefore, it is possible that consumption taxation is
more efficient than income taxation (Rosen 484). In their 2001 study, economists Dale
Jorgenson and Kun-Young Yun used a model of the U.S. economy to measure the excess
burden of the major government revenue sources. They compared the efficiency of
resource allocation under two scenarios: the 1996 federal tax law and a hypothetical
situation in which all revenue is raised with a nondistorting lump sum tax. They
estimated the marginal excess burden of a dollar of income tax revenue to be
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approximately 35 cents (302). This means that a public project that is funded with
income tax revenue would have to produce marginal benefits of more than $1.35 per
dollar of expenditure to improve welfare. The marginal excess burden of a dollar of sales
tax revenue is approximately 17 cents. Jorgenson and Yun write that governments can
reduce excess burden by shifting taxation from income to consumption (304). By
inducing this shift, the withdrawal of federal tax deductibility may spark a trend toward
greater efficiency in state and local tax systems. But it may also cause state and local tax
systems to become more regressive.
The vertical equity of a tax system refers to the relative tax burdens that it places
on households with different incomes. A progressive tax system apportions tax burdens
to households in relation to their ability to pay. Thus, a wealthy household would have a
higher average tax burden than a low-income household. With a regressive tax system,
the opposite is the case. Low-income households spend most of their incomes while
wealthy households save substantial proportions of their incomes. Consequently,
consumption taxation imposes a higher tax burden on the poor. For this reason, sales
taxes tend to be regressive. An income tax is levied both on earned income and income
from savings, so it tends to place higher tax burdens on the wealthy. Thus, it tends to be
progressive. In their 2003 study, the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy found
that 7 of the 10 states with the most regressive tax systems derived “between half and
two-thirds of their tax revenues” from consumption taxes, “compared to the national
average of 35 percent” (3). 8 The least regressive states tended to have personal income
taxes with progressive rate structures or low reliance on sales taxes (4).9 If the

8
9

These states are Washington, Florida, Tennessee, South Dakota, Texas, Nevada, and Alabama.
The least regressive states are Delaware, Montana, Vermont, and California.
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elimination of federal tax deductibility induces a shift from income to consumption
taxation, state and local tax structures would become more regressive. But the policy
change could make the federal income tax structure more progressive. Reuban (2005)
estimates that the federal income tax burden could increase by 3.5 percent on average for
households earning more than $75,000 a year. Low-income households would be largely
unaffected. This is because higher-income households tend to itemize while low-income
households are more likely to take the standard deduction (503-504). The federal income
tax burden would most likely shift toward states like Maryland, which have large
proportions of itemizers.
Conclusion
The results presented in this paper provide the following conclusions concerning
the possible impact of the elimination of federal tax deductibility on the mix of personal
tax revenues:
•

Net-of-federal tax price is negatively and significantly related to income tax
revenue as a proportion of personal income. Thus, the elimination of federal tax
deductibility may lead to decreased use of the income tax by state and local
governments.

•

Sales tax revenue as a proportion of personal income is positively and
significantly related to price. This indicates that sales tax revenue is a substitute
for income tax revenue. Consequently, the elimination of federal tax deductibility
may induce greater reliance on sales taxes.
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•

These changes could increase the efficiency of state and local tax structures but
decrease their equity. However, the federal income tax may become more
progressive.
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Appendix 1
Calculation of Average Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates
In order to calculate the average net-of-federal tax prices for each state, I first had
to estimate the average marginal federal income tax rates faced by itemizers in each state.
I did this by matching the statutory marginal rate for each group of taxable income with
each of the 11 AGI classes reported in the IRS state-level income tax data. The IRS data
lists the number of itemizers in each of the 11 classes. I weighted each tax rate with the
number of itemizers reported in each class. I added the products to arrive at a weighted
average marginal federal tax rate for each state. Table 6 details the procedure for
Kentucky.
Table 5: Official Statutory Tax Rate Schedule, 2001
Single Returns
Tax Rate (%)
15
27.5

Joint Returns
Taxable Income
Taxable Income
Tax Rate (%)
$0-$27,050
$0-$45,200
15
$27,050-$65,550
$45,200-$109,250
27.5
$109,250$166,500
$65,550-$136,750
30.5
30.5
$136,750$166,500$297,350
$297,350
35.5
35.5
Over $297,350
39.1
Over $297,350
39.1
Source: Campbell, David and Michael Parisi. “Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares,
2002.”

Table 6: Estimated Marginal Tax Rate for Itemizers in Kentucky, 2001
Tax
Rate
AGI Group
Number of Itemizers
Less than $10,000
15
13,646
$10,000 under $20,000
15
29,091
$20,000 under $30,000
15
48,120
$30,000 under $50,000
27.5
128,411
$50,000 under $75,000
27.5
157,179
$75,000 under $100,000
30.5
86,330
$100,000 under $150,000
30.5
54,211
$250,000 under $200,000
35.5
14,959
$200,000 under $500,000
39.1
16,143
$500,000 under $1,000,000
39.1
2,715
Over $1,000,000
39.1
1,037
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Internal
Revenue Service. “Individual Tax Statistics—State Income
For 2000 and 2001.”

% Total
Itemizers
0.024728092
0.052716176
0.087198872
0.232695228
0.284826092
0.156439706
0.098236452
0.027107397
0.029252938
0.004919886
0.001879161
Weighted
Average Tax
Rate

Adjusted Tax Rate
0.370921387
0.79074264
1.307983082
6.39911877
7.832717517
4.77141102
2.996211778
0.962312582
1.143789889
0.192367562
0.073475198
26.84105142
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Appendix 2
Regression Model
Revenue=B1(Tax Price) + B2(Per Capita Income) + B3(Fed Trans % Inc) + B4(Pupils
Per Capita) + B5(Road Mileage Per Capita) + B6(Nonwhite) + B7(Poverty) + B8(Aged)
+ B9(Homeown) + B10(Urban) + B11(Married) + B12(Gini) + B13(Div Int Per $) +
B14(Cap G Per $) + B15(Gov) + B16(Citi) + U
Description of Variables
Dependent Variables
I used three dependent variables: per capita revenue from state and local income, sales,
and property taxes as a percentage of per capita income in each state. Sales tax revenue
consists of revenue from general and selective sales taxes (e.g. taxes on gasoline and
cigarettes). I obtained data on revenues from the 2002 Census of Governments. The data
on per-capita money income and population are from Census 2000.
Independent Variables
Per Capita Income: The per capita money income for each state.**
Fed Trans % Inc: Per capita federal transfers to state and local governments as a
percentage of per capita income in each state. Source: 2002 Census of Governments.
Tax Price: The cost of $1 of state and local revenue from deductible taxes. I calculated it
by multiplying the proportion of itemizers in each state by the average marginal federal
income tax rate for itemizers in the state and then subtracting the product from 1.*
Pupils Per Capita: The number of elementary, secondary, and post secondary students
in each state divided by the population of the state.**
Road Mileage Per Capita: Road mileage in each state divided by the state’s
population.**
Nonwhite: Percentage of nonwhite citizens.**
Poverty: Percentage of households with incomes beneath the federal poverty level.**
Aged: Percentage of the state’s population over the age of 65. **
Homeown: The homeownership rate for each state. This is the percentage of occupied
housing units that are owner-occupied.**
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Urban: Percentage of the state’s population living in urban areas.**
Married: Percentage of citizens aged 15 and over in each state who are married. This
includes those whose spouses are absent from the household. **
Gini: The Gini Ratio for each state according to 1999 U.S. Census data (“Table S4”).
The Gini Ratio measures the inequality of income distribution. A more negative
coefficient indicates greater inequality and vice versa.
Div Int Per $: Dividend and interest income per dollar of AGI for each state. Author’s
calculations using IRS state-level data.*
Cap G Per $: Net capital gains per dollar of AGI for each state. Author’s calculations
using IRS state-level data.*
Gov: The ideology scores for state governments. In their 1998 paper, “Measuring
Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93,” Berry et al elaborate
methods for the quantifying the ideologies of citizens in each state, as well as state
governments. State government ideology scores are based on the party affiliation of the
governor and the party composition of state legislatures. The score is a weighted average
that denotes the strength of each party (332-334). The authors updated the data on both
citizen and government ideology and made it available on the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research Publication-Related Archive. The files
contain data through 2002. I used the 2001 data in the regression analysis.
Citi: The ideology scores for citizens in each state. Berry et al based the scores on
interest group ratings on each state’s members of Congress and election returns for
congressional races. A higher score denotes greater liberalism (330-331).
*U.S. Internal Revenue Service. “Individual Tax Statistics—State Income for 2000 and 2001.”
**Source: Census 2000.

